Risk Management Strategies

Three Clouds Run 70% of the World's Infrastructure and Three Networks Process 97% of Card Payments: Mapping the Contingent BI Your Indian Business Has Never Declared

A Swiss Re Institute and LSE study finds links between corporate risks up 24% since 2019, with cloud, payments and chips highly concentrated. How Indian firms can map these dependencies and match each to the right business interruption trigger.

Tarun Kumar Singh
Tarun Kumar SinghStrategic Risk & Compliance SpecialistAIII · CRICP · CIAFP
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Last reviewed: November 2026

What the Swiss Re Institute and LSE Study Found

A September 2026 study by the Swiss Re Institute and the London School of Economics, reported by Asia Insurance Post on 25 September, looked at the risks that 91 Fortune 100 companies disclose and how those risks connect. Its central finding: the links between reported risks rose 24% compared with 2019. Risks that used to be treated separately (a supplier problem, a technology failure, a natural catastrophe) are increasingly described as feeding each other.

Two drivers stand out. The first is technology. The share of companies reporting AI and new-technology risks rose about 30% from 2019 to 2026, and the reporters now include retailers, airlines, pharmaceutical companies and food businesses, not just technology firms. The second is concentration. The study notes that:

  • Three providers controlled 70% of global cloud infrastructure in 2024.
  • Three companies process 97% of global credit card transactions.
  • 88% of Taiwan's semiconductor plants sit in areas of extreme seismic risk.
  • Over 40% of US data centres are in significant tornado-risk zones.

Each of those numbers describes a single point of failure that sits outside any one company's control and outside its premises. That is exactly the type of loss most Indian business interruption programmes were never built to cover.

Why Indian BI Programmes Miss These Exposures

An Indian mid-size business rarely thinks of itself as exposed to Taiwanese earthquakes or a US cloud region. Yet the chain is short. A retailer's point-of-sale, inventory and e-commerce systems may all run in one cloud region. Its card and UPI acceptance depends on a payment aggregator, an acquiring bank and the networks behind them. An electronics assembler or auto component maker depends on chips that, for advanced nodes, come overwhelmingly from Taiwan.

The insurance programme, meanwhile, was built around physical property. A typical Indian commercial client buys:

  1. A fire and allied perils policy with business interruption (fire loss of profits) cover, which responds to interruption following insured physical damage at its own premises.
  2. Possibly a suppliers' or customers' extension, which extends that cover to physical damage at the premises of named suppliers or customers.
  3. Possibly a public utilities extension, which covers interruption caused by physical damage at an electricity, water or telecom provider's installation.
  4. Possibly a cyber policy, bought separately and often by a different person in the business.

None of the first three responds to a non-physical event at a hyperscaler or a payment network. A configuration error that takes down a cloud region, or a processing outage at a card network, damages nothing. The cyber policy may respond, but only if it carries the right dependent business interruption trigger. Our post on non-damage business interruption for utility and telecom outages covers the same gap for power and network providers.

A Dependency-Mapping Exercise in Three Steps

The concentration numbers only become useful when they are turned into a map of your own dependencies. Do this as a structured exercise, not a brainstorm.

Step 1: list revenue-critical processes. Start with the processes that stop revenue within a day if they fail: order taking, billing, payment acceptance, dispatch, production scheduling, customer support. For each, note the maximum tolerable outage before losses become material.

Step 2: trace each process to its providers. For every process, list the providers it actually runs on, down to the specific service:

  • Cloud and hosting. Which provider, which region, and whether there is a second region configured and tested. Many Indian businesses run everything in a single Mumbai or Hyderabad region with no failover.
  • Software as a service. ERP, CRM, warehouse management, e-invoicing and GST compliance tools, each of which sits on its own cloud provider. Two different SaaS vendors on the same hyperscaler region are one dependency, not two.
  • Payments. Payment aggregator, acquiring bank, card networks and UPI. A single aggregator handling cards, UPI and wallets is a concentration point even though the underlying rails differ.
  • Components. For manufacturers, the chips, controllers and modules with a single geographic source, and the tier-2 suppliers behind your direct vendors.

Step 3: mark shared points. The output should show where many processes converge on one provider, one region or one country. Those convergence points are your concentration exposures. For most firms there will be three to six of them, and they will not appear anywhere on the property schedule.

Matching Each Dependency to a Trigger

Once the map exists, test each concentration point against the cover you actually hold. The question for each is simple: if this provider fails for 24 hours, 72 hours or a week, which policy pays, under what trigger, after what waiting period?

Supplier extensions under the fire BI policy. A named-supplier or unnamed-supplier extension on a fire loss of profits policy responds to physical damage by an insured peril at the supplier's premises. That is relevant to the chip example: an earthquake that damages a fab could trigger it, if earthquake is an insured peril, the supplier is within the extension, and the sub-limit is adequate. It is not relevant to a cloud outage or a payment-network failure, which involves no physical damage.

Non-damage contingent BI

A smaller market offers non-damage contingent business interruption, which responds to interruption at a supplier without requiring physical damage. Capacity is limited, triggers are specific, and underwriters want detailed dependency information, which is exactly what the mapping exercise produces. It can suit businesses with a few critical non-IT suppliers whose failure would halt production.

Cyber dependent business interruption

For cloud and SaaS dependencies, the natural home is a cyber insurance policy with dependent business interruption cover. Two distinctions decide whether it pays:

  1. Security failure versus system failure. Some wordings cover only outages caused by a malicious attack at the provider. Others extend to non-malicious system failure, such as a faulty update or configuration error. Most large cloud outages fall into the second category.
  2. Waiting period and limit. Dependent BI often carries a longer waiting period, measured in hours, and a sub-limit well below the main BI limit.

Our analysis of AI provider concentration and dependent system failure cover explains how those wordings are evolving as AI services become another single point of failure.

Where Parametric Cover Fits

Parametric cover pays a pre-agreed amount when a measurable trigger is met, without proving the actual loss. For concentration risks it has two attractions: it can respond to events that cause no physical damage, and it pays quickly.

The design challenge is basis risk. The trigger has to be something both parties can measure independently: a recorded earthquake magnitude at a defined location, for example, or a publicly reported outage duration. If your actual loss does not track the trigger closely, you can suffer a loss with no payout, or receive a payout larger than the loss. For Indian businesses, parametric structures for technology outages are still new and largely bespoke. They are worth exploring for a large, well-defined dependency, but should not be assumed to be available off the shelf.

Managing the Gap That Insurance Will Not Fill

Some concentration exposure will remain uninsured or only partly insured, however well the programme is built. That residual risk has to be managed directly.

  • Redundancy. Multi-region or multi-cloud deployment for the most critical systems, a second payment aggregator configured and tested, and dual sourcing for single-source components where it is commercially possible.
  • Contracts. Service-level agreements with credits that actually compensate, notice obligations for planned changes, and clear provisions on data portability. Most standard cloud contracts cap liability at a small multiple of fees, so do not treat SLA credits as a substitute for insurance.
  • Inventory buffers. For chips and controllers with a single geographic source, a deliberate buffer stock sized to the time it would take to qualify an alternative.
  • Offline fallbacks. Manual billing procedures, offline payment acceptance and paper-based dispatch for short outages. These cost little and shorten the gap before any waiting period is crossed.
  • Testing. A failover that has never been tested is not a failover. Run a planned switch at least once a year.

For SaaS-heavy businesses, our post on cloud dependency and business interruption for SaaS companies has more detail on contract and architecture options.

What to Bring to the Renewal Meeting

Turn the analysis into a short brief for your broker before renewal. It should cover:

  1. The dependency map, showing the three to six concentration points and the processes that depend on each.
  2. Estimated loss by outage duration for each point: 24 hours, 72 hours and one week.
  3. Current cover by trigger: physical damage at own premises, physical damage at supplier, non-damage, malicious cyber event, non-malicious system failure.
  4. The gaps, and which you want to insure, which you will manage by redundancy or contract, and which you accept.
  5. Specific wording requests: system failure cover in cyber dependent BI, adequate supplier extension sub-limits including earthquake for critical component sources, and waiting periods that match your tolerance.

The Swiss Re Institute and LSE findings say what risk managers have suspected for some time: the risks companies face are more connected than their insurance programmes assume. Mapping your own dependencies is the step that turns that general observation into a business interruption programme that fits the business you actually run.

About the Author

Tarun Kumar Singh

Tarun Kumar Singh

Strategic Risk & Compliance Specialist

  • AIII
  • CRICP
  • CIAFP
  • Board Advisor, Finexure Consulting
  • Developer of the Behavioural Underinsurance Risk Index (BURI)

Tarun Kumar Singh is a seasoned risk management and insurance professional based in Bengaluru. He serves as Board Advisor at Finexure Consulting, where he advises insurance, fintech, and regulated firms on governance, growth, and trust. His work spans insurance broker regulatory frameworks across India, UAE, and ASEAN, IRDAI compliance and Corporate Agency model reform, VC governance in insurtech, and MSME insurance gap analysis. He is the developer of the Behavioural Underinsurance Risk Index (BURI), a framework applying behavioural economics to underinsurance and insurance fraud risk.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does my business interruption policy cover a cloud outage?
A standard Indian fire loss of profits policy does not, because it needs insured physical damage at your premises or, under an extension, at a named supplier's premises. A cloud outage usually damages nothing. Cover for it normally comes from a cyber policy with dependent business interruption, provided the wording covers the cause of the outage.
What is the difference between security failure and system failure in cyber dependent BI?
Security failure covers outages caused by a malicious act, such as a cyber attack on your provider. System failure extends to non-malicious causes such as a faulty software update, configuration error or hardware fault. Many large cloud outages are non-malicious, so system failure cover is often the more important of the two.
Would a supplier extension cover a chip shortage after an earthquake in Taiwan?
Possibly, if earthquake is an insured peril under the extension, the affected supplier falls within it (named, or covered as unnamed), and the sub-limit is adequate. It would not cover a shortage caused by something other than physical damage, such as export restrictions or demand spikes.
How do I find my concentration exposures?
List the processes that stop revenue within a day if they fail, trace each to the specific providers, cloud regions, payment intermediaries and component sources it depends on, and mark where several processes share the same provider. Those shared points are your concentration exposures.

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