What has changed: CIRCIA's final rule has reached the White House
The US Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA) has spent four years as a statute without an operating rule. That is close to changing. According to HIPAA Journal's report of 5 October 2026, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has sent its CIRCIA final rule to the Office of Management and Budget for review, and a final rule is expected before the end of the year.
The timing has already slipped once. Nextgov/FCW reported in July 2026 that CISA had expected to finalise the rule by September 2026. OMB review is the last stage before publication in the Federal Register, but it can take weeks or months and the text can change during it. Until the rule is published, every threshold discussed below should be read as expected rather than settled.
The reporting clocks themselves come from the statute and are not expected to move:
- 72 hours to report a covered (substantial) cyber incident to CISA.
- 24 hours to report a ransom payment made in response to a ransomware attack.
HIPAA Journal puts the scope at roughly 316,000 entities across 16 critical infrastructure sectors, and the covered population includes manufacturers of regulated drugs and medical devices. That is the line that matters for India. Indian pharmaceutical, API and device groups that own or operate US manufacturing plants, fill-finish sites or device assembly facilities are likely to fall inside the rule through their US entities, regardless of where the parent is headquartered.
Who in Indian pharma and devices is likely to be covered
CIRCIA applies to entities in critical infrastructure sectors that meet the rule's size or sector-specific criteria. The final text will define those criteria, so groups should map exposure now and confirm once the rule is published. Based on the sectors HIPAA Journal describes as covered, the Indian groups most likely to be affected fall into three buckets.
- US-manufacturing subsidiaries of Indian generics and specialty pharma companies that hold FDA-regulated drug manufacturing operations on US soil.
- Medical device makers with US assembly, sterilisation or contract manufacturing plants producing FDA-regulated devices.
- API and CDMO groups that have acquired US sites to sit closer to innovator customers, a pattern that accelerated with US tariff and supply-chain policy (see our note on US specialty pharma tariff changes for Indian exporters).
An Indian company that only exports finished product to US distributors, with no US plant or US operating entity, is less likely to be a covered entity in its own right. It may still feel the rule through contracts: US customers and distributors that are covered will push reporting cooperation clauses down the supply chain, asking suppliers to notify them fast enough for the customer to meet its own 72-hour clock.
Stacking the clocks: CERT-In's 6 hours against CIRCIA's 72 and 24
Indian groups already live with a much shorter clock. CERT-In's directions of April 2022 require specified cyber incidents to be reported within six hours of being noticed, and, as Ahuva noted in September 2026, those directions remain unamended. Our CERT-In incident reporting guide covers the Indian side in detail.
For a group with plants in both countries, a single ransomware event that spreads from a US site into shared Indian IT systems can trigger three separate deadlines:
- Hour 6: CERT-In report for the Indian entities whose systems are affected.
- Hour 24 after a payment: CIRCIA ransom payment report by the US entity, if a ransom is paid.
- Hour 72: CIRCIA covered incident report by the US entity to CISA.
The clocks also start on different triggers. CERT-In runs from the time the incident is noticed or brought to notice. CIRCIA's 72 hours runs from when the entity reasonably believes a covered incident has occurred, and the 24-hour ransom clock runs from the payment itself. A group playbook that tracks only one start time will miss at least one deadline.
Why the short clock helps
Because CERT-In already forces a six-hour triage, Indian security teams that have built for it have most of the muscle CIRCIA needs: an incident commander, a classification decision tree and a pre-approved reporting template. The work is extending that playbook to US entities, adding a US legal sign-off step, and making sure the facts reported to CERT-In and to CISA are consistent, since both filings may later be read by insurers, regulators and plaintiffs.
Ransom payment reporting and cyber extortion cover
The 24-hour ransom payment report is the part of CIRCIA most likely to change how claims run under cyber extortion cover. Today, many extortion sections of cyber policies require the insured to obtain the insurer's prior written consent before paying, to involve the insurer's panel negotiator, and to notify law enforcement where appropriate. Once CIRCIA is final, a US covered entity that pays will also owe CISA a report within a day of payment.
That creates three friction points worth fixing in policy wordings before the rule takes effect:
- Consent and timing. If insurer consent to pay is slow, the payment slips, but the 24-hour reporting window only starts at payment. The risk is less about missing the deadline and more about the insured paying first under operational pressure and seeking consent afterwards, which can jeopardise indemnity.
- Reporting costs. Legal and forensic fees incurred to prepare the CISA submission should fall within the policy's incident response or regulatory costs section. Check that the definition of regulatory proceeding or regulatory costs is wide enough to cover mandatory reports, not only investigations.
- Sanctions screening. Insurers will not reimburse payments to sanctioned parties. The negotiator's sanctions check should be documented in a form that can be reused in the CISA report and in the claim file.
For the Indian legal position on payments and insurance recovery, see our analysis of ransom payments and cyber insurance in India.
Notification clauses: one incident, several audiences
Mandatory reporting rules and insurance notification clauses run on separate tracks, and CIRCIA adds a third. Most cyber policies require notice to the insurer as soon as practicable, and some specify a number of days. Breach coaches and panel firms are usually engaged through an insurer hotline. A US plant hit by ransomware will therefore have to notify the insurer, CISA (within 72 hours, or 24 hours after a payment), and, through the Indian group, CERT-In within six hours.
Practical steps for the group risk manager:
- Align the policy trigger with the regulatory trigger. Ask insurers to confirm in writing that a CIRCIA or CERT-In filing does not itself count as an admission of liability, and that sharing the filing with the insurer satisfies part of the notice requirement.
- Pre-approve reporting counsel. If the US subsidiary's preferred cyber counsel is not on the insurer's panel, agree rates and approval before an incident, not during one.
- Share one fact base. The facts in the CERT-In report, the CISA report and the claim notification should be drawn from the same incident log to avoid inconsistencies that an insurer or regulator may later question.
These points apply equally to Indian IT companies with US and UK cyber liability exposure, which face the same problem of several regulators and one policy programme.
Aligning the global cyber programme with local admitted policies
Most Indian pharma and device groups with US plants buy cyber cover in one of two ways: a master policy placed in India or through a global insurer, with local admitted policies in the US, or a standalone US policy bought by the US subsidiary. CIRCIA is a good prompt to check that the two fit together, using the principles in our guide to global insurance programmes with master and local policies.
Questions to put to the broker
- Does the US admitted policy name every US operating entity likely to be a CIRCIA covered entity, including recently acquired plants?
- Is there a regulatory costs or mandatory reporting costs section, and does it expressly include reports to CISA under CIRCIA?
- Does the master policy's difference in conditions (DIC) wording pick up extortion, incident response and business interruption where the local policy is narrower?
- How does the programme handle a single event that hits Indian and US systems? One retention, or one per policy?
- Does the business interruption section cover contingent loss from a shared IT platform run out of India?
Business interruption and product continuity
For drug and device manufacturers, the largest loss after a cyber event is usually lost production and batch release delays, not the ransom. A US plant whose manufacturing execution or quality systems are encrypted may be unable to release product for weeks. Waiting periods, the definition of system failure and whether OT systems are covered all deserve review alongside the CIRCIA work.
A 90-day plan before the rule is published
Because the final rule is expected before year-end, groups have a short window to prepare. A practical sequence:
- Weeks 1 to 3: map entities. List every US entity, the sector it operates in, and whether it manufactures FDA-regulated drugs or devices. Flag likely covered entities, pending confirmation against the final text.
- Weeks 3 to 6: merge playbooks. Extend the CERT-In six-hour playbook to add CIRCIA's 72-hour and 24-hour clocks, the CISA submission route and US legal sign-off.
- Weeks 6 to 9: review wordings. Check extortion consent conditions, regulatory costs definitions, territorial scope and the master and local policy interaction with the broker.
- Weeks 9 to 12: test. Run a tabletop exercise built around a ransomware event that starts in a US plant and spreads to Indian systems, with the insurer's breach response hotline participating.
Once the rule is published, revisit the entity map against the final size and sector criteria and update the playbook for the final report contents. Renewal discussions in early 2027 should then reflect the final text, not the expected one.
Share the tabletop exercise output with cyber underwriters at renewal. Evidence that a group can meet a six-hour Indian clock and the US 72-hour and 24-hour clocks from one incident log is a concrete control that supports terms.